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BIANNUAL SURVEY

porate beneficiary, an indispensable party. Pursuant to CPLR
3211(a)(10), a motion was made to dismiss the complaint upon
the ground that "the court should not proceed in the absence of a
person who should be a party." In ruling on the motion, the
court was faced with the question of whether the CPA's dualmotion procedure was incorporated into the CPLR. Under prior
practice, 114 it was necessary to make two motions: first, to direct
the plaintiff to join the omitted party; and, second, if plaintiff
refused, to dismiss the complaint. 15
The court adopted the view put forth by the Biannual Survey
of New York Practice24 that in light of CPLR 104, the former
dual-motion requirement was merely an unnecessary delay.
CPLR 1007:

Vouching-in notice-

third-party practice.

At common law a defendant having a third party liable over
to him could vouch him into the litigation, and, by giving him
proper notice of the suit, bind him by a final judgment 17 Vouchingin, though still available, is seldom employed since CPLR 1007
provides a much easier method of impleading a third-party defendant. However, vouching-in remains an integral part of our
procedural law since it can be employed to reach a third-party
defendant when the impleading party cannot meet the requirements
of CPLR 1007.118
Bouleris v. Cherry-Burrell Corp.'1 9 discusses some of the more
significant aspects of the vouching-in procedure. Bouleris involved
a proceeding on a motion to vacate a vouching-in notice prior
to a trial on the merits. In denying the motion to vacate, the
court held that the only ground upon which such a motion can
20
be granted, at that stage of the proceeding, is untimely notice'
The ruling in the instant case is based upon an examination
of the nature of notice procedures for vouching-in. The court found
that vouching-in is merely an invitation to a party, whom the defendant considers to be liable over to him, to come in and defend.
If that.party defaults, the third-party defendant will be held liable
for any judgment that might be recovered against the third-party
14 RCP 102; CPA §§ 192-93.
115 E.g., Wolff v. Brontown Realty Corp., 281 App. Div. 752, 118 N.Y.S.2d
74 (2d Dep't 1953); Marsico v. Tramutolo, 135 N.Y.S.2d 258 (Sup. Ct.
Queens County 1954).
118 38 ST. Jonn's L. Rzv. 447-48 (1964).

Note, 11 Btnr-Ai.o L. REv. 90 (1962).
118 For instance, if the defendant were a domiciliary of a foreign state
117

and not amenable to service under CPLR 301 or 302(a).
12945

Misc. Zt 318, 256 N.Y.S.2d 537 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1964).

Id. at 319, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 538; see also Urback v. City of New York,
46 Misc. 2d 503, 259 N.Y.S.2d 975 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1965).
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plaintiff. The procedure is entirely informal, requiring no particular language; it can be written or oral. In view of this, the
court determined that it would serve121no purpose to vacate the
notice at this stage of the proceeding.
Upon default, and after liability is determined in the first
action, the third-party plaintiff may proceed against the third-party
defendant; in that second action the latter will be bound by the
prior decision. However, the third-party plaintiff's right to this
relief over will not be enforceable unless his action against the
third-party defendant is identical to that asserted by the plaintiff
in the original action. Thus, if the third-party defendant is improperly vouched-in, he may always raise this as a defense. There
is, therefore, no automatic liability flowing from such a notice.222
ARTICLE

12-

INFANTS AND INCOmPETENTS

CPLR 1201: Guardian ad litem appointed for unadjudicatedsncompetent plaintiff.
CPLR 1201, although providing that an adult defendant may
have a guardian ad litem appointed where he is incapable of
adequately defending his rights, makes no provision for a plaintiff
similarly incapacitated. 23 In Leibowitz v. Hunter,1 24 a motion
was made for the appointment of a guardian ad litem for the adult
plaintiff in a personal injury action. It was entirely possible that
plaintiff would remain unconscious for a period of several months.
The court granted the motion stating that CPLR 1201 did not
preclude by negative inference the appointment of a guardian ad
litem for an unadjudicated-incompetent plaintiff. It would appear
that the court was justified in taking this position due to the fact
that CPLR 1201 is the analogue of CPA § 207 which was
amplified by subsequent case law 1 25 to extend the scope of the
statute to include unadjudicated-incompetent adult plaintiffs.
It would seem that the court has reached a favorable conclusion in affording the incompetent plaintiff the opportunity to
pursue his cause of action with the aid of a guardian ad litem.
An interpretation which would have precluded a plaintiff under
121 See Urback v. City of New York, supra note 120, at 504, 259 N.Y.S.2d
at 977, where the court points out that a vouching-in notice does not
have
122 the same effect as process.
Bouleris v. Cherry-Burrell Corp., 45 Misc. 2d 318, 319, 256 N.Y.S.2d
537, 541 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1964).
1232 WEINSMN, KORN & MILLER, NEW YoRx CIVIL PRActicE ff 1201.01

(1964).
124 45 Misc. 2d 580, 257 N.Y.S.2d 434 (Sup. Ct N.Y. County 1965).
125 Sengstack v. Sengstack,

176 N.Y.S.2d 337, 342 (1958).

4 N.Y2d 502, 510, 151 N.E.2d 887, 890,

